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Abstract 
 
  In this study, we use the method of Boone et al. (2007, How (not) to measure competition, 
TILEC Discussion Paper, No. 2007 - 014), known as the Boone indicator, to estimate competition in 
the banking industry in Japan. Classical methods, for example, market share, price-cost margin, and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, are not monotonically related to competition, so they are 
inappropriate. On the other hand, as many studies by Boone suggest, the Boone indicator can 
capture precisely the degree of competition. Our results show that the banking industry in Japan has 
been more competitive in recent years. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1980, financial markets around the world have changed surprisingly because of globalization 
and deregulation. In Japan too, deregulation and mergers and acquisitions have occurred in the 
banking, securities, and insurance industries, and have led to the formation of huge banks and 
financial conglomerates. Furthermore, for some decades, the Japanese economy has undergone big 
changes: the bubble economy in the late 1980s, long-term recession in the 1990s, the financial “big-
bang” between 1996 and 2001, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. These shifts in the 
financial environment have provided changes in the financial structure as well as the state of 
competition. 
  Recently, researchers have argued about whether deregulation makes the banking industry 
more competitive. Berger et al. (2004) insist that banks’ concentration and competition affect 
financial stability and economic growth. This has revealed the importance of investigating the state 
of bank competition. Moreover, Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Boone (2008a, 2008b) suggest 
that some classical competition indexes, for instance, the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), cannot 
capture the state of competition precisely. From this result, Claessens and Laeven (2004) emphasize 
an approach that considers firms’ entry to the market, that is, contestability. 
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  There are many studies on the state of competition in the Japanese banking industry. Uchida 
and Tsutsui (2005) extend the methodology of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) to investigate 
panel data for Japanese banks from 1974 to 2000. They show that the banking industry had become 
more competitive by the mid-1980s, and that regional banks were more competitive than major city 
banks. On the other hand, Tsutsui (2009) estimates the price-cost margin (PCM) and the H-statistic 
to investigate the state of competition among Japan’s regional banks. His result suggests that the 
lending market among Shinkin banks, relatively small regional banks, became competitive gradually. 
Furthermore, Molyneux et al. (1996) estimate the H-statistic and conclude that in 1986 and 1988, 
the state of competitiveness among Japanese city and regional banks was rather less competitive. 
Niimi (1998) uses the H-statistic to investigate competitiveness among the city banks and long-term 
credit banks before and after the bubble economy in the late 1980s. He finds that the state changed 
from “monopoly/coalition” to “monopolistic competition.” 
  Besides the banking industry, other financial institutions in Japan have been investigated from 
a competition viewpoint by researchers. Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) investigate the competitive 
condition of the Japanese securities industry over the period 1983-2002 using the H-statistic and 
find that the industry was monopolistic between 1991 and 1996. Kubota and Tsutsui (2009) use a 
questionnaire survey in 2006-2007 to demonstrate from the results of the H-statistic and the PCM 
that the market for consumer credit is monopolistic. Souma and Tsutsui (2010) examine the change 
in the degree of competition in the Japanese life insurance industry during the period 1986-2002.  
In order to obtain the degree of noncompetition and collusion, they estimate the first-order condition 
for profit-maximizing insurance oligopolies. Their result suggests that competition has increased 
since 1995 in the industry. 
  On the other hand, Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Delis (2012) study the factors that trigger 
bank competition. Claessens and Laeven (2004) regress the H-statistic on the variables for banking 
system structures and contestability. They find that those variables are correlated with banks’ 
competitiveness. Using the Boone indicator, Delis (2012) shows that the variables for financial 
reform, law quality, and bureaucratic quality make banks competitive. In addition, Uchida and 
Tsutsui (2005) regress their index of bank competition on a variety of variables. Their result 
suggests that the trading amount of government bonds affects the degree of bank competition. 
  In this study, we estimate the Boone indicator, for the Japanese regional banking industry from 
1989 to 2009. The Boone indicator, introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008a), is an 
index that outperforms other competitive measures. We investigate the competitiveness for regional 
banks, second-tier regional banks, Shinkin banks, and credit unions in each year. 
  The main results are as follows. Whereas the estimated Boone indicator differs across 
categories, it tends to increase gradually, that is, the Japanese regional banking industry has become 
more competitive. For comparative purposes, we estimate the HHI, PCM, and H-statistic. 
Surprisingly, these measures suggest a decrease in the competitiveness of the regional banking 
industry. Our sample is in the period when a variety of deregulations were promoted, and thus, our 
results of the Boone estimator are intuitive relative to the other indexes. 
  The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the Boone indicator and 
explains the methodology of estimation and our data. Section 3 demonstrates the estimated Boone 
indicator. Section 4 compares the results with other measures of competition. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The method 
2.1 The Boone indicator 
Boone et al. (2005, 2007) and Boone (2008a, 2008b) present some measures for competitiveness. 
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Their common feature is that in a competitive market, more efficient firms obtain higher profits. 
These measures are called the “Boone indicator.”1 In this subsection, we explain the Boone 
indicator in the context of banking. 
  Bank i (i = 1,…, N) maximizes profit 
 
(1) 
 
where Li denotes loans, Di is deposits, rL > 0 is the interest rate of the loans, and C(・,・) is the cost 
function. The balance sheet of bank i is Li = Di. For simplicity, we assume that each bank faces 
demand for bank lending, 
 
(2) 
 
and the cost function, C(Di, Li) = cDi Di +cLi Li. In addition, we assume there is an entry cost γ, so 
bank i enters the loan market when πi > γ. 
  From these assumptions, we obtain 
 
(3) 
 
 
where ci = cLi + cDi. The first-order condition is 
 
(4) 
 
Using Eq. (4) for all banks, we solve for Li as 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
From Eqs. (3), (4), and (5), we obtain 
 
(6) 
 
So far, we have specified the functions. Generally, the profit function is written as a function of 
ci, π (ci). In addition, higher marginal cost leads to lower profit, π′(ci) < 0. Put differently, if we 
denote z         , then 
 
(7) 
 
zi is greater as the market becomes competitive. If we denote the parameters that ease the state of 
competition as θ = a, b, γ and the parameters that tighten the state of competition as ϕ = d, N, we 
obtain 
 
 
                                                                 
1 To our knowledge, the first study that named these measures the Boone indicator is Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011). 
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(8) 
 
These inequalities suggest that in a more competitive market, profits negatively react with marginal 
cost much more. Intuitively, in a competitive market, more effective firms outperform others, and 
thus, they should earn more profit. On the other hand, if firms are less effective, they should earn 
less profit. 
  Boone et al. (2007) propose a method to estimate the impact of marginal cost ci on profit πi. 
They estimate the marginal cost elasticity of profit 
 
(9) 
 
Boone et al. (2007) call this profit elasticity (PE). Since firms with less costs have more profits, 
other things equal, PE is greater than zero. Competition makes efficient firms more profitable, and 
thus, the more competitive the sector is, the greater is PE. The earlier measures for competitiveness 
are criticized for several reasons. Suppose that there is a competitive market and that one of the 
firms came to be managed more efficiently. In other words, all firms in this market attempt as much 
as possible to earn more profit. Then, the firm that becomes effective earns more profit than others 
do. In this case, the Boone indicator indicates the more effective firm is more profitable, whereas 
the other measures do not. For instance, the HHI suggests that the market share of that firm is 
greater than before, and thus, the HHI indicates the firm is less competitive. For problems with the 
other measures, see Boone et al. (2005, 2007) and Boone (2008a). 
  There is criticism that the estimation of PE needs data for profits, which often comprises 
significant errors and that is why the PCM tends to be preferred. However, since the numerator of 
the PCM is price minus marginal cost, we obtain 
 
(10) 
 
That is, Eq. (10) is rewritten as the ratio of profit to income. Therefore, the PCM substantively uses 
data for profits, and thus, the problem of some errors is inevitable. On the other hand, the estimation 
of PE contains an error term, which alleviates the problem of profit errors. 
  Moreover, Boone (2008a, 2008b) proves that under a moderate condition, a more competitive 
market brings a stronger effect of firms’ efficiency on their profits, and the authors propose two 
indicators: relative profits (RP) and relative profit differences (RPD).2 Any types of the Boone 
indicator monotonically change against a change in competitiveness. 
 
2.2 The estimation method 
Following Boone et al. (2007), we estimate PE as follows. First, from the problem of firms’ profit 
maximization, we obtain a profit function of marginal cost, π (ci). We take ln π (ci) as a first-order 
Taylor approximation with respect to ln ci, 
 
(11) 
 
 
                                                                 
2 Boone et al. (2005) conduct a simulation, in which RP outperforms the other measures for competitiveness. 
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To estimate this equation, we add a vector of control variables,   , and an error term with mean zero, εi, 
 
 
Since the marginal cost is unobservable, we estimate the translog cost function to obtain the 
estimate of marginal cost, cˆ  i.3 Then, we obtain the estimate of the coefficient,  , so that 
 
 
is the estimate of PE. For the estimation, we use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. While 
we estimate marginal costs by the translog cost function, the estimates can contain a measurement 
error, which could lead to endogeneity in the PE regression. To solve the errors-in-variable problem, 
we apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
  It is important to note that the Boone indicator implicitly assumes that firms’ profit is non-
negative. Boone (2008b, p. 1248, Definition 1) assumes firms’ profit is greater than the entry cost  
γi, that is, πi > γi . Since γi > 0, profit should be positive. 
 
2.3 Other estimation methods 
Several researchers propose methods to estimate the Boone indicator. There are two methods to 
estimate PE. Schaeck and Cihak (2010) use the model, 
 
(14) 
 
where TAi is total assets and πi / TAi is return on assets (ROA). However, the authors do not clearly 
explain the reason why the dependent variable is ROA instead of profit. ROA consists of total assets, 
and thus, β presents the effect of marginal cost not only on profit, but also on TA. This leads to 
estimation bias.  
  Next, Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) estimate the model, 
 
 
where si is the share of products. Originally, Boone et al. (2007) criticize the share measures, and 
thus, the estimate of β is not the Boone indicator. In fact, Boone et al. (2005) compare the share 
measure with the Boone indicator, and conclude that the share measure can fail to capture the 
change in competitiveness. Therefore, the estimation by Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) is not 
reliable. 
  On the other hand, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2000) presents an 
estimate of β in the model, 
 
(16) 
 
to obtain RP. Eq. (16) is assumed a linear relation between relative profit and relative cost. Taking 
the logarithms for these variables yields 
 
(17) 
 
In this case, as Boone et al. (2005) suggest, the estimate of β is equivalent to that in Eq. (12). 
                                                                 
3 For the detailed estimation, see the Appendix. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Data 
We use the Boone (2007) competition indicator approach to assess the degree of competition in the 
Japanese regional banking industry. The Boone indicator, that is, PE, is calculated by the marginal 
cost elasticity of bank profit. We estimate the impact of marginal cost on profit of banks, where the 
coefficient  is obtained, so that   is the estimate of PE. The larger is PE, the more intense is 
competition. This indicator monotonically changes with a change in competitiveness. We use the 
two estimators, OLS and 2SLS. Furthermore, to compare the results, we present results using three 
alternative measures of competition: HHI, PCM, and Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic. 
  We select regional banks, including second-tier regional banks, Shinkin banks, and credit 
unions. We use bank-level data from the Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest, the Zenkoku Shinyo 
Kinko Zaimu Syohyo, and the Zenkoku Shinyo Kumiai Zaimu Syohyo, databases containing bank 
financial statements. The estimation period is from fiscal year 1989 to 2009. We use data from 
unconsolidated accounts to avoid double counting. The actual estimated Eq. (12) requires data on 
profit πi and marginal cost cˆ  i. πi, which is the profit obtained by the bank from its lending operations, 
is defined as interest income minus interest expenses, personnel expenses, and equipment expenses. 
Since we study the lending market, our definition of bank profits should incorporate the costs of 
lending operations, that is, we subtract the lending losses from the profits. However, our dataset has 
few observations of lending losses.4 As marginal cost cannot be observed, the estimation cˆ  i, 
obtained by estimating the translog cost function, was used (see the appendix for an explanation of 
the estimations). The variable used to estimate the translog cost function is as follows. Cost C is 
defined as the sum of interest on deposits, personnel expenses, and equipment expenses. The input 
factor w1 is the interest rate for fundraising, defined as the ratio of interest on deposits to total 
amount of deposits. w2 is the wage rate, defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of 
employees. The share of input factor sj is the ratio of interest on deposits to cost C. The output factor 
q is the total financial assets, defined as the total amount of loans. We use the 2SLS approach with 
the instrumental variable being the deposit-cost rate of the explanatory variable, marginal costs.5 
  Xi is the control variable vector. We use the capital adequacy ratios to control for differences in 
the soundness of the bank management, the ratio of securities to total assets to control for the 
differences in the amounts of securities held, the number of employees per branch to control for 
differences in the size of financial institutions, and the loan-to-deposit ratio to control for economies 
of scope. After considering that there is heterogeneity in the behavior between the business 
categories, we use a Shinkin banks dummy, credit unions dummy, share-listing dummy, and second-
tier regional banks dummy. However, for estimates using only Shinkin banks and credit unions, the 
number of members is added. 
  At the stage prior to the analysis, to exclude the influence of outliers, values outside of the 
range of the mean value of profit and marginal cost, ± the standard deviation × 2.58, are excluded in 
each fiscal year for each business category. Moreover, the data set used for the estimates excludes 
banks that cannot be used for the necessary variables. In addition, financial institutions are excluded 
where data on profit and marginal cost cannot be used. 
  
                                                                 
4 In Japan, moreover, during our sample period, a number of banks lent to bad firms, which is called “zombie 
lending.” This implies that even if we could utilize lending losses, the results would not necessarily reflect the 
actual profits of banks. 
5 The deposit-cost rate is defined as (interest paid for deposit) / (total amount of deposits) + (personnel expenses + 
equipment expenses) / (ordinary income). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show the sample averages of the main variables over the 
entire period by business category. Table 2 shows the profit and marginal costs during the period. 
The sample size for the entire period is largest for Shinkin banks, at 7,188; followed by credit 
unions, at 5,161; and then regional banks, at 2,352. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables
All financial institutions Regional banks
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
pi (log) 6.503 1.644 6.467 -1.580 10.722 8.808 0.949 8.906 5.024 10.722
c (log) -3.314 0.530 -3.432 -4.978 -1.738 -3.651 0.598 -3.854 -4.735 -2.412
w1 (log) -0.008 0.294 -0.017 -1.693 4.526 -0.007 0.280 -0.012 -1.159 1.312
w2 (log) -0.003 0.166 -0.004 -4.039 2.414 -0.004 0.152 0.003 -0.696 0.394
The total amount of loans (log) 11.295 1.703 11.211 5.076 15.642 13.837 0.814 13.955 11.358 15.642
The total amount of deposits (log) 11.733 1.601 11.627 5.829 15.839 14.099 0.837 14.211 11.590 15.839
Interest on loans (log) 8.054 1.616 7.982 2.187 12.930 10.401 0.798 10.430 8.074 12.930
Interest on deposits (log) 6.758 1.881 6.717 0.388 12.799 8.854 1.584 8.872 4.466 12.799
Bank loan interest rate (%) 4.266 1.806 3.617 -0.082 36.099 3.560 1.713 2.798 1.494 8.341
Bank deposit interest rate (%) 1.546 1.645 0.603 0.018 30.253 1.307 1.543 0.449 0.018 5.750
Total assets (log) 11.857 1.589 11.746 6.021 16.018 14.212 0.846 14.327 11.684 16.018
Ordinary income (log) 8.496 1.555 8.381 2.750 13.377 10.827 0.847 10.873 8.382 13.377
Capital ratio (%) 5.089 2.886 4.720 -58.535 161.124 4.012 2.366 3.937 -48.015 8.840
Ratio of securities (log) 16.612 11.650 15.144 0.000 173.877 19.042 6.440 17.896 0.517 46.129
Employees per branch (log) 2.627 0.345 2.639 0.100 6.879 2.768 0.238 2.775 1.382 3.562
Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) 67.019 52.585 68.319 7.252 6177.899 77.346 8.000 77.478 53.652 170.241
Ratio of non-performing loans (%) 7.830 6.731 6.533 0.000 81.228 4.700 4.023 4.017 0.038 53.191
Deposit-cost rate (%) 4.275 1.886 3.586 0.676 32.486 3.350 1.654 2.596 1.311 7.825
Average cost (log) -3.140 0.515 -3.263 -4.998 -1.294 -3.462 0.518 -3.647 -4.375 -2.345
Debt ratio (log) 2.996 0.436 3.003 -0.653 7.320 3.187 0.325 3.193 2.333 6.632
Branches 29 36 15 1 284 97 42 91 20 284
Employees 469 704 203 2 24296 1647 912 1484 285 5110
Members 17341 18251 12037 45 361219
N 14701 2352
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
pi (log) 6.626 1.079 6.667 -1.580 9.026 5.281 1.316 5.440 -1.339 8.044
c (log) -3.300 0.500 -3.481 -4.341 -2.079 -3.180 0.469 -3.240 -4.978 -1.738
w1 (log) -0.005 0.205 -0.012 -0.865 4.526 -0.013 0.390 -0.031 -1.693 2.192
w2 (log) -0.003 0.136 -0.003 -4.039 2.414 -0.002 0.206 -0.009 -2.944 2.380
The total amount of loans (log) 11.453 0.971 11.420 8.166 14.531 9.916 1.331 10.089 5.076 13.453
The total amount of deposits (log) 11.911 0.956 11.862 7.888 14.982 10.407 1.167 10.523 5.829 13.493
Interest on loans (log) 8.188 0.936 8.132 4.873 11.589 6.798 1.348 6.982 2.187 10.563
Interest on deposits (log) 6.834 1.520 6.853 2.357 11.421 5.696 1.605 5.710 0.388 10.225
Bank loan interest rate (%) 4.129 1.685 3.380 1.432 10.185 4.780 1.866 4.515 -0.082 36.099
Bank deposit interest rate (%) 1.463 1.644 0.502 0.025 30.253 1.771 1.666 0.929 0.020 10.273
Total assets (log) 12.031 0.937 11.986 8.784 15.041 10.541 1.159 10.650 6.021 13.766
Ordinary income(log) 8.636 0.906 8.596 5.465 11.877 7.238 1.153 7.312 2.750 10.806
Capital ratio (%) 5.391 2.133 5.220 -55.927 48.142 5.159 3.766 4.435 -58.535 161.124
Ratio of securities (log) 18.295 9.399 16.792 0.122 173.877 13.160 15.037 8.114 0.000 76.697
Employees per branch (log) 2.690 0.285 2.671 0.201 6.879 2.475 0.403 2.485 0.100 5.354
Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) 65.083 72.962 64.483 19.982 6177.899 65.009 19.392 68.290 7.252 369.939
Ratio of non-performing loans (%) 7.956 5.301 7.258 0.000 81.228 9.944 9.258 8.513 0.000 67.310
Deposit-cost rate (%) 4.228 1.767 3.462 1.452 32.486 4.763 1.977 4.263 0.676 17.594
Average cost (log) -3.138 0.477 -3.308 -4.192 -1.918 -2.995 0.500 -3.042 -4.998 -1.294
Debt ratio (log) 2.918 0.373 2.898 0.687 5.426 3.017 0.523 3.068 -0.653 7.320
Branches 21 15 17 1 113 8 8 6 1 78
Employees 343 411 245 11 24296 108 117 74 2 846
Members 20790 19703 14927 379 361219 12537 14721 7829 45 129926
N 7188 5161
16
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Table 2. Profit and marginal cost 
 
 
 
Table 2: Profit and marginal cost
All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Profit Marginal N Profit Marginal N Listing Second
cost cost -tier
1989 6.186 -2.795 918 8.500 -2.891 123 71 24
1990 6.057 -2.556 880 8.102 -2.585 114 65 24
1991 6.196 -2.499 860 8.420 -2.568 123 71 25
1992 6.229 -2.655 864 8.671 -2.808 120 71 25
1993 6.106 -2.799 844 8.499 -2.993 121 72 25
1994 6.668 -3.013 845 9.079 -3.213 119 71 24
1995 6.632 -3.211 840 9.030 -3.454 124 74 25
1996 6.691 -3.431 824 8.985 -3.689 120 71 25
1997 6.603 -3.525 793 8.903 -3.782 119 71 25
1998 6.558 -3.585 760 8.887 -3.860 116 71 25
1999 6.625 -3.638 724 8.988 -3.951 118 72 24
2000 6.474 -3.632 679 8.937 -3.989 109 71 23
2001 6.447 -3.701 599 8.895 -4.087 108 71 24
2002 6.520 -3.769 587 8.893 -4.183 110 73 25
2003 6.638 -3.819 554 8.969 -4.228 106 74 25
2004 6.749 -3.841 540 9.016 -4.252 103 74 25
2005 6.854 -3.874 539 9.007 -4.274 103 74 25
2006 6.937 -3.833 530 9.030 -4.210 100 73 24
2007 6.797 -3.714 516 8.884 -4.080 102 74 25
2008 6.644 -3.713 504 8.723 -4.104 98 72 25
2009 6.692 -3.761 501 8.633 -4.182 96 72 25
Mean 6.503 -3.314 8.808 -3.651
Sum 14701 2352 1508 517
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Profit Marginal N Profit Marginal N
cost cost
1989 6.505 -2.762 428 5.038 -2.800 367
1990 6.421 -2.523 413 4.972 -2.586 353
1991 6.512 -2.462 403 4.995 -2.518 334
1992 6.417 -2.604 406 5.137 -2.661 338
1993 6.257 -2.747 392 5.052 -2.790 331
1994 6.922 -2.970 392 5.512 -2.994 334
1995 6.878 -3.179 391 5.420 -3.156 325
1996 6.947 -3.404 385 5.520 -3.367 319
1997 6.849 -3.512 379 5.359 -3.439 295
1998 6.759 -3.581 369 5.307 -3.473 275
1999 6.697 -3.620 362 5.375 -3.514 244
2000 6.532 -3.628 345 5.192 -3.465 225
2001 6.347 -3.665 312 5.145 -3.531 179
2002 6.405 -3.733 306 5.200 -3.568 171
2003 6.466 -3.783 288 5.402 -3.614 160
2004 6.638 -3.801 279 5.466 -3.643 158
2005 6.794 -3.850 278 5.554 -3.656 158
2006 6.914 -3.809 274 5.635 -3.631 156
2007 6.698 -3.665 267 5.530 -3.549 147
2008 6.579 -3.655 261 5.356 -3.552 145
2009 6.662 -3.710 258 5.477 -3.578 147
Mean 6.626 -3.300 5.281 -3.180
Sum 7188 5161
17
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3.2 Estimation results of the Boone indicator 
We estimate the following four Boone indicators for regional banking industries for each year: (1) 
financial institutions in all three business categories (all financial institutions), (2) regional banks, 
(3) Shinkin banks, and (4) credit unions. From Eq. (12), the coefficient of the marginal cost, 
obtained from the estimates using OLS and 2SLS, is defined as the PE. After multiplying the value 
of the coefficient obtained by -1, the results could be interpreted as showing that the larger the value 
is, the more competitive is the market. 
  
Table 3. Estimation result of the Boone indicator: OLS 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimation result of the Boone indicator: OLS
All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 2.4216 3.295 1.548 [0.445]*** 917 0.6701 3.7645 5.864 1.665 [1.060]*** 123 0.5906
1990 0.6090 1.694 -0.476 [0.553] 880 0.5886 4.9938 7.778 2.209 [1.404]*** 114 0.4810
1991 0.3809 1.390 -0.628 [0.514] 859 0.6511 4.8127 7.030 2.595 [1.120]*** 123 0.6814
1992 1.6126 2.452 0.773 [0.428]*** 862 0.6653 5.7689 7.667 3.871 [0.958]*** 120 0.6956
1993 1.4804 2.367 0.593 [0.452]*** 841 0.5850 4.5664 6.732 2.401 [1.093]*** 121 0.5742
1994 1.2392 2.021 0.458 [0.398]*** 844 0.6909 4.2390 5.831 2.647 [0.803]*** 119 0.6818
1995 1.2785 2.013 0.544 [0.374]*** 838 0.6584 2.9179 4.453 1.383 [0.775]*** 123 0.6323
1996 0.6794 1.200 0.159 [0.265]** 822 0.6893 2.1367 3.361 0.912 [0.618]*** 119 0.5435
1997 0.8405 1.319 0.362 [0.244]*** 779 0.6785 1.6264 2.849 0.404 [0.617]*** 117 0.5440
1998 1.0978 1.578 0.618 [0.244]*** 749 0.6758 2.4190 3.875 0.963 [0.734]*** 113 0.6179
1999 1.4657 1.983 0.949 [0.263]*** 711 0.6990 4.1917 5.418 2.966 [0.618]*** 114 0.6889
2000 1.6668 2.298 1.035 [0.322]*** 673 0.6877 2.4201 3.824 1.016 [0.708]*** 109 0.6248
2001 1.8901 2.541 1.239 [0.331]*** 596 0.6656 2.7966 4.067 1.526 [0.640]*** 107 0.6605
2002 1.6629 2.306 1.020 [0.327]*** 587 0.6396 3.3261 4.520 2.132 [0.602]*** 110 0.6691
2003 1.8841 2.410 1.358 [0.268]*** 554 0.6931 2.5363 3.172 1.901 [0.320]*** 106 0.7599
2004 1.7538 2.325 1.183 [0.291]*** 539 0.7112 3.1622 3.837 2.487 [0.340]*** 102 0.7579
2005 1.8745 2.434 1.315 [0.285]*** 539 0.7114 2.9162 3.680 2.152 [0.385]*** 103 0.6758
2006 1.8870 2.461 1.313 [0.292]*** 530 0.7032 2.9213 3.834 2.009 [0.459]*** 100 0.6665
2007 2.6967 3.446 1.947 [0.382]*** 516 0.7027 3.4962 4.544 2.449 [0.528]*** 102 0.7297
2008 2.7598 3.455 2.064 [0.354]*** 503 0.6513 4.4443 5.507 3.382 [0.535]*** 98 0.7324
2009 1.9409 2.673 1.209 [0.373]*** 500 0.6641 3.9830 4.878 3.088 [0.450]*** 95 0.7157
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
1990 5.2970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
1992 3.5879 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.9214 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
1993 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 328 0.4388
1994 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
1996 1.8575 2.377 1.338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 1.257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.5256
1997 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 354 0.7749 0.6118 1.071 0.153 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
2000 1.7337 2.343 1.125 [0.310]*** 345 0.7438 0.7727 1.458 0.088 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 312 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
2002 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 306 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.173 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
2004 2.0797 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 279 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 158 0.4729
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.112 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
2007 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 267 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
2008 2.5324 3.478 1.587 [0.480]*** 260 0.6840 1.2186 2.040 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
19 0 5. 970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
1992 3.5879 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.9214 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
19 3 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 328 0.4388
19 4 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
1996 1.8575 2.377 1.338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 1.257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.5256
19 7 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 54 0.7749 0.6118 1.071 0.153 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
2000 1.7337 2.343 1.125 [0.310]*** 345 0.7438 0.7727 1.458 0.088 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 312 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
20 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 06 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.173 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
20 4 2.07 7 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 79 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 158 0.4729
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.112 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
20 7 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 67 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
20 2.5324 3.478 1.587 [0.4 0]*** 260 0.6840 1.218 2.040 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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Note: Robust standard errors in parenthese . Asterisks indicate significance at th following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 2.4216 3.295 1.548 [0.445]*** 917 0.6701 3.7645 5.864 1.665 [1.060]*** 123 0.5906
1990 0.6090 1.694 -0.476 [0.553] 880 0.5886 4.9938 7.778 2.209 [1.404]*** 114 0.4810
1991 0.3809 1.390 -0.628 [0.514] 859 0.6511 4.8127 7.030 2.595 [1.120]*** 123 0.6814
1992 1.6126 2.452 0.773 [0.428]*** 862 0.6653 5.7689 7.667 3.871 [0.958]*** 120 0.6956
1993 1.4804 2.367 0.593 [0.452]*** 841 0.5850 4.5664 6.732 2.401 [1.093]*** 121 0.5742
1994 1.2392 2.021 0.458 [0.398]*** 844 0.6909 4.2390 5.831 2.647 [0.803]*** 119 0.6818
1995 1.2785 2.013 0.544 [0.374]*** 838 0.6584 2.9179 4.453 1.383 [0.775]*** 123 0.6323
1996 0.6794 1.200 0.159 [0.265]** 822 0.6893 2.1367 3.361 0.912 [0.618]*** 119 0.5435
1997 0.8405 1.319 0.362 [0.244]*** 779 0.6785 1.6264 2.849 0.404 [0.617]*** 117 0.5440
1998 1.0978 1.578 0.618 [0.244]*** 749 0.6758 2.4190 3.875 0.963 [0.734]*** 113 0.6179
1999 1.4657 1.983 0.949 [0.263]*** 711 0.6990 4.1917 5.418 2.966 [0.618]*** 114 0.6889
2000 1.6668 2.298 1.035 [0.322]*** 673 0.6877 2.4201 3.824 1.016 [0.708]*** 109 0.6248
2001 1.8901 2.541 1.239 [0.331]*** 596 0.6656 2.7966 4.067 1.526 [0.640]*** 107 0.6605
2002 1.6629 2.306 1.020 [0.327]*** 587 0.6396 3.3261 4.520 2.132 [0.602]*** 110 0.6691
2003 1.8841 2.410 1.358 [0.268]*** 554 0.6931 2.5363 3.172 1.901 [0.320]*** 106 0.7599
2004 1.7538 2.325 1.183 [0.291]*** 539 0.7112 3.1622 3.837 2.487 [0.340]*** 102 0.7579
2005 1.8745 2.434 1.315 [0.285]*** 539 0.7114 2.9162 3.680 2.152 [0.385]*** 103 0.6758
2006 1.8870 2.461 1.313 [0.292]*** 530 0.7032 2.9213 3.834 2.009 [0.459]*** 100 0.6665
2007 2.6967 3.446 1.947 [0.382]*** 516 0.7027 3.4962 4.544 2.449 [0.528]*** 102 0.7297
2008 2.7598 3.455 2.064 [0.354]*** 503 0.6513 4.4443 5.507 3.382 [0.535]*** 98 0.7324
2009 1.9409 2.673 1.209 [0.373]*** 500 0.6641 3.9830 4.878 3.088 [0.450]*** 95 0.7157
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
199 5.2970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
1992 3.5879 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.9214 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
1993 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 328 0.4388
1994 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
1996 1.8575 2.377 1.338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 1.257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.5256
1997 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 354 0.7749 0.6118 1.071 0.153 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
2000 1.7337 2.343 1.125 [0.310]*** 345 0.7438 0.7727 1.458 0.088 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 312 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
2002 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 306 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.173 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
2004 2.0797 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 279 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 158 0.4729
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.112 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
2007 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 267 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
2008 2.5324 3.478 1.587 [0.480]*** 260 0.6840 1.2186 2.040 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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Table 4: Estimation result of the Boone indicator: 2SLS
All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 6.2053 7.376 5.034 [0.597]*** 917 0.6325 7.6837 10.331 5.036 [1.351]*** 123 0.5358
1990 6.7534 9.060 4.447 [1.177]*** 880 0.5034 7.2818 10.075 4.489 [1.425]*** 114 0.4707
1991 6.7125 8.587 4.838 [0.956]*** 859 0.5680 4.8802 6.907 2.853 [1.034]*** 123 0.6813
1992 5.7600 7.212 4.308 [0.741]*** 862 0.6140 5.7469 7.425 4.068 [0.856]*** 120 0.6956
1993 4.7099 6.110 3.310 [0.714]*** 841 0.5433 4.8796 6.788 2.971 [0.974]*** 121 0.5737
1994 4.3459 5.503 3.188 [0.591]*** 844 0.6477 6.4140 8.242 4.586 [0.933]*** 119 0.6619
1995 4.1939 5.426 2.962 [0.629]*** 838 0.6106 5.8738 7.819 3.929 [0.992]*** 123 0.5779
1996 2.9526 3.738 2.168 [0.401]*** 822 0.6386 4.5361 5.931 3.141 [0.712]*** 119 0.4857
1997 3.0315 3.763 2.300 [0.373]*** 779 0.6313 3.7614 4.934 2.589 [0.598]*** 117 0.4869
1998 2.8996 3.680 2.120 [0.398]*** 749 0.6417 4.3919 5.573 3.211 [0.603]*** 113 0.5784
1999 3.3566 4.109 2.604 [0.384]*** 711 0.6654 5.4405 6.524 4.357 [0.553]*** 114 0.6741
2000 3.7337 4.524 2.943 [0.403]*** 673 0.6514 4.8000 6.181 3.419 [0.705]*** 109 0.5643
2001 4.0854 5.023 3.148 [0.478]*** 596 0.6307 4.7502 6.126 3.374 [0.702]*** 107 0.6259
2002 3.1084 3.842 2.375 [0.374]*** 587 0.6201 3.8496 4.993 2.706 [0.584]*** 110 0.6656
2003 2.6700 3.339 2.001 [0.341]*** 554 0.6862 2.2638 2.862 1.666 [0.305]*** 106 0.7582
2004 2.8857 3.574 2.197 [0.351]*** 539 0.6981 3.0691 3.716 2.422 [0.330]*** 102 0.7577
2005 2.8992 3.603 2.196 [0.359]*** 539 0.7006 3.2294 3.998 2.461 [0.392]*** 103 0.6733
2006 3.1143 3.922 2.306 [0.412]*** 530 0.6890 3.3700 4.173 2.567 [0.410]*** 100 0.6617
2007 3.8826 4.839 2.926 [0.488]*** 516 0.6918 3.8087 4.679 2.938 [0.444]*** 102 0.7280
2008 3.8530 4.684 3.022 [0.424]*** 503 0.6409 4.7806 5.778 3.784 [0.509]*** 98 0.7311
2009 3.1449 4.033 2.257 [0.453]*** 500 0.6495 4.1220 5.079 3.165 [0.488]*** 95 0.7154
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 5.8114 6.863 4.760 [0.537]*** 428 0.7644 6.0424 7.285 4.800 [0.634]*** 366 0.5344
1990 7.4345 9.015 5.854 [0.807]*** 413 0.7078 5.5030 8.653 2.353 [1.607]*** 353 0.4521
1991 4.9863 7.247 2.726 [1.153]*** 403 0.7200 7.0050 9.558 4.452 [1.303]*** 333 0.4225
1992 4.3728 5.831 2.915 [0.744]*** 406 0.7374 6.3339 8.109 4.559 [0.906]*** 336 0.4466
1993 3.3860 5.992 0.780 [1.330]** 392 0.5083 5.2856 6.727 3.844 [0.735]*** 328 0.3907
1994 3.4577 4.441 2.474 [0.502]*** 392 0.7967 4.4571 5.453 3.461 [0.508]*** 333 0.5423
1995 4.2892 5.466 3.113 [0.600]*** 391 0.7642 3.5822 4.532 2.632 [0.485]*** 324 0.4441
1996 2.4211 3.046 1.796 [0.319]*** 385 0.8190 2.3667 3.085 1.649 [0.366]*** 318 0.4490
1997 2.7646 3.302 2.227 [0.274]*** 379 0.7865 2.4348 3.194 1.675 [0.388]*** 283 0.3943
1998 2.5249 3.068 1.982 [0.277]*** 367 0.7884 2.1087 2.853 1.365 [0.380]*** 269 0.4434
1999 1.9696 2.817 1.122 [0.432]*** 354 0.7716 2.1657 2.964 1.368 [0.407]*** 243 0.5185
2000 2.5393 3.210 1.869 [0.342]*** 345 0.7376 2.5810 3.581 1.581 [0.510]*** 219 0.4196
2001 2.6517 3.403 1.900 [0.383]*** 312 0.6656 2.9443 4.043 1.845 [0.561]*** 177 0.4162
2002 2.4767 3.318 1.635 [0.429]*** 306 0.6748 1.8898 2.640 1.140 [0.383]*** 171 0.3719
2003 2.7743 3.497 2.051 [0.369]*** 288 0.6896 1.2899 2.043 0.537 [0.384]*** 160 0.4718
2004 2.5911 3.205 1.977 [0.313]*** 279 0.7697 1.6613 2.474 0.849 [0.415]*** 158 0.3991
2005 2.7068 3.354 2.060 [0.330]*** 278 0.6954 1.6423 2.373 0.912 [0.373]*** 158 0.5070
2006 2.0684 2.626 1.511 [0.285]*** 274 0.7757 2.1782 3.133 1.223 [0.487]*** 156 0.5343
2007 3.2209 4.117 2.324 [0.457]*** 267 0.7386 2.7544 4.111 1.398 [0.692]*** 147 0.5011
2008 2.7359 3.617 1.855 [0.450]*** 260 0.6835 2.5808 3.727 1.434 [0.585]*** 145 0.5334
2009 2.8535 4.172 1.535 [0.673]*** 258 0.7123 1.9550 2.883 1.027 [0.473]*** 147 0.5777
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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Table 3: Estimation result of the Boone indicator: OLS
All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 2.4216 3.295 1.548 [0.445]*** 917 0.6701 3.7645 5.864 1.665 [1.060]*** 123 0.5906
1990 0.6090 1.694 -0.476 [0.553] 880 0.5886 4.9938 7.778 2.209 [1.404]*** 114 0.4810
1991 0.3809 1.390 -0.628 [0.514] 859 0.6511 4.8127 7.030 2.595 [1.120]*** 123 0.6814
1992 1.6126 2.452 0.773 [0.428]*** 862 0.6653 5.7689 7.667 3.871 [0.958]*** 120 0.6956
1993 1.4804 2.367 0.593 [0.452]*** 841 0.5850 4.5664 6.732 2.401 [1.093]*** 121 0.5742
1994 1.2392 2.021 0.458 [0.398]*** 844 0.6909 4.2390 5.831 2.647 [0.803]*** 119 0.6818
1995 1.2785 2.013 0.544 [0.374]*** 838 0.6584 2.9179 4.453 1.383 [0.775]*** 123 0.6323
1996 0.6794 1.200 0.159 [0.265]** 822 0.6893 2.1367 3.361 0.912 [0.618]*** 119 0.5435
1997 0.8405 1.319 0.362 [0.244]*** 779 0.6785 1.6264 2.849 0.404 [0.617]*** 117 0.5440
1998 1.0978 1.578 0.618 [0.244]*** 749 0.6758 2.4190 3.875 0.963 [0.734]*** 113 0.6179
1999 1.4657 1.983 0.949 [0.263]*** 711 0.6990 4.1917 5.418 2.966 [0.618]*** 114 0.6889
2000 1.6668 2.298 1.035 [0.322]*** 673 0.6877 2.4201 3.824 1.016 [0.708]*** 109 0.6248
2001 1.8901 2.541 1.239 [0.331]*** 596 0.6656 2.7966 4.067 1.526 [0.640]*** 107 0.6605
2002 1.6629 2.306 1.020 [0.327]*** 587 0.6396 3.3261 4.520 2.132 [0.602]*** 110 0.6691
2003 1.8841 2.410 1.358 [0.268]*** 554 0.6931 2.5363 3.172 1.901 [0.320]*** 106 0.7599
2004 1.7538 2.325 1.183 [0.291]*** 539 0.7112 3.1622 3.837 2.487 [0.340]*** 102 0.7579
2005 1.8745 2.434 1.315 [0.285]*** 539 0.7114 2.9162 3.680 2.152 [0.385]*** 103 0.6758
2006 1.8870 2.461 1.313 [0.292]*** 530 0.7032 2.9213 3.834 2.009 [0.459]*** 100 0.6665
2007 2.6967 3.446 1.947 [0.382]*** 516 0.7027 3.4962 4.544 2.449 [0.528]*** 102 0.7297
2008 2.7598 3.455 2.064 [0.354]*** 503 0.6513 4.4443 5.507 3.382 [0.535]*** 98 0.7324
2009 1.9409 2.673 1.209 [0.373]*** 500 0.6641 3.9830 4.878 3.088 [0.450]*** 95 0.7157
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
1990 5.2970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
19 2 3.5879 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.9214 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
1993 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 328 0.4388
1994 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
19 6 1.8575 2.377 .338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 .257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.525
1997 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 354 0.7749 0.6118 1.071 0.153 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
20 0 1.7337 2.343 .125 [0.310]*** 345 0.7438 0.7727 1.458 0.0 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 312 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
2002 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 306 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.173 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
20 4 2.0797 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 279 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 158 0.4729
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.112 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
2007 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 267 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
20 2.5324 3.478 .587 [0.4 0]*** 260 0.6840 1.2186 2.040 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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Table 3: Estimation result of the Boone indicator: OLS
All financial institutions Regio al banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicat r (upper) (lower)
1989 2.4216 3.295 1.548 [0.445]*** 917 0.6701 3.7645 5.864 1.665 [1. 60]*** 123 0.5906
1990 0.6090 1.694 -0.476 [0.553] 880 0.5886 4.9938 7.778 2.209 [1.404]*** 114 0.4810
1991 0.3809 1.390 -0.628 [0.514] 859 0.6511 4.8127 7. 30 2.595 [1.120]*** 123 0.6814
1992 1.6126 2.452 0.773 [0.428]*** 862 0.6653 5.7689 7.667 3.871 [0.958]*** 120 0.6956
1993 1.4804 2.367 0.593 [0.452]*** 841 0.5850 4.5664 6.732 2.401 [1. 93]*** 121 0.5742
1994 1.2392 2.021 0.458 [0.398]*** 844 0.6909 4.2390 5.831 2.647 [0.803]*** 119 0.6818
1995 1.2785 2.013 0.544 [0.374]*** 838 0.6584 2.9179 4.453 1.383 [0.775]*** 1 3 0.6323
1996 0.6794 1.200 0.159 [0.265]** 822 0.6893 2.1367 3.361 0.912 [0.618]*** 119 0.5435
1997 0.8405 1.319 0.362 [0.244]*** 779 0.6785 1.6264 2.849 0.404 [0.617]*** 1 7 0.5440
1998 1.0978 1.578 0.618 [0.244]*** 749 0.6758 2.4190 3.875 0.963 [0.734]*** 113 0.6179
1999 1.4657 1.983 0.949 [0.263]*** 7 1 0.6990 4.1917 5.418 2.966 [0.618]*** 114 0.6889
2000 1.6668 2.298 1.035 [0.322]*** 673 0.6877 2.4201 3.824 1.01 [0.708]*** 109 0.6248
2001 1.8901 2.541 1.239 [0.331]*** 596 0.6656 2.7966 4. 67 1.526 [0.640]*** 107 0.6605
2002 1.6629 2.306 1.020 [0.327]*** 587 0.6396 3.3261 4.520 2.132 [0.602]*** 110 0.6691
2003 1.8841 2.410 1.358 [0.268]*** 554 0.6931 2.5363 3.172 1.901 [0.320]*** 106 0.7599
2004 1.7538 2.325 1.183 [0.291]*** 539 0.7112 3.1622 3.837 2.487 [0.340]*** 102 0.7579
2005 1.8745 2.434 1.315 [0.285]*** 539 0.7114 2.9162 3.680 2.152 [0.385]*** 103 0.6758
2006 1.8870 2.461 1.313 [0.292]*** 530 0.7032 2.9213 3.834 2.009 [0.459]*** 100 0.6665
2007 2.6967 3.446 1.947 [0.382]*** 516 0.7027 3.4962 4.544 2.449 [0.528]*** 102 0.7297
2008 2.7598 3.455 2.064 [0.354]*** 503 0.6513 4.4443 5.507 3.382 [0.535]*** 98 0.7324
2009 1.9409 2.673 1.209 [0.373]*** 500 0.6641 3.9830 4.878 3.088 [0.450]*** 95 0.7157
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicat r (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
1990 5.2970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
1992 3.5879 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.921 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
1993 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 3 8 0.4388
1994 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
1996 1.8575 2.377 1.338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 1.257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.5256
1997 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 354 0.7749 0.6118 1. 71 0.15 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
2000 1.7337 2.343 1.125 [0.31 ]*** 345 0. 438 0.7727 1.458 0.088 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 3 2 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
2002 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 306 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.17 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
2004 2.0797 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 279 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 15 0.472
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.11 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
2007 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 267 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
2008 2.5324 3.478 1.587 [0.48 ]*** 260 0.6840 1.2186 2. 40 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. A erisks in icate ig ificance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ sig ificance 1%.
18
Table 3: Estimation result of the Boone indicator: OLS
All financial institutions Regional banks
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 2.4216 3.295 1.548 [0.445]*** 917 0.6701 3.7645 5.864 1.665 [1.060]*** 123 0.5906
1990 0.6090 1.694 -0.476 [0.553] 880 0.5886 4.9938 7.778 2.209 [1.404]*** 114 0.4810
1991 0.3809 1.390 -0.628 [0.514] 859 0.6511 4.8127 7.030 2.595 [1.120]*** 123 0.6814
1992 1.6126 2.452 0.773 [0.428]*** 862 0.6653 5.7689 7.667 3.871 [0.958]*** 120 0.6956
1993 1.4804 2.367 0.593 [0.452]*** 841 0.5850 4.5664 6.732 2.401 [1.093]*** 121 0.5742
1994 1.2392 2.021 0.458 [0.398]*** 844 0.6909 4.2390 5.831 2.647 [0.803]*** 119 0.6818
1995 1.2785 2.0 3 0.544 [0.374]*** 838 0.6584 2.9179 4.453 1.383 [0.775]*** 123 0.6323
1996 0.6794 1.200 0.159 [0.265]** 822 0.6893 2.1367 3.361 0.912 [0.618]*** 119 0.5435
1997 0.8405 1.319 0.362 [0.244]*** 779 0.6785 1.6264 2.849 0.404 [0.617]*** 117 0.5440
1998 1.0978 1.578 0.618 [0.244]*** 749 0.6758 2.4190 3.875 0.963 [0.734]*** 113 0.6179
1999 1.4657 1.983 0.949 [ .263]*** 711 0.6990 4.1917 5.418 2.966 [0.618]*** 114 0.6889
2000 1.6668 2.298 1.035 [0.322]*** 673 0.6877 2.4201 3.824 1.016 [0.708]*** 109 0.6248
2001 1.8901 2.541 1.239 [0.331]*** 596 0.6656 2.7966 4.067 1.526 [0.640]*** 107 0.6605
2002 1.6629 2.306 1.020 [0.327]*** 587 0.6396 3.3261 4.520 2.132 [0.602]*** 110 0.6691
2003 1.8841 2.410 1.358 [0.268]*** 554 0.6931 2.5363 3.172 1.901 [0.320]*** 106 0.7599
2004 1.7538 2.325 1.183 [0.291]*** 539 0.7112 3.1622 3.837 2.487 [0.340]*** 102 0.7579
2005 1.8745 2.434 1.315 [0.285]*** 539 0.7114 2.9162 3.680 2.152 [0.385]*** 103 0.6758
2006 1.8870 2.461 1.313 [0.292]*** 530 0.7032 2.9213 3.834 2.009 [0.459]*** 100 0.6665
2007 2.6967 3.446 1.947 [0.382]*** 516 0.7027 3.4962 4.544 2.449 [0.528]*** 102 0.7297
2008 2.7598 3.455 2.064 [0.354]*** 503 0.6513 4.4443 5.507 3.382 [0.535]*** 98 0.7324
2009 1.9409 2.673 1.209 [0.373]*** 500 0.6641 3.9830 4.878 3.088 [0.450]*** 95 0.7157
ɹ
Shinkin banks Credit unions
ɹ
Boone CI CI N R2 Boone CI CI N R2
indicator (upper) (lower) indicator (upper) (lower)
1989 4.9114 5.997 3.826 [0.552]*** 428 0.7669 3.6173 4.658 2.577 [0.529]*** 366 0.5655
1990 5.2970 6.677 3.917 [0.702]*** 413 0.7159 1.0355 2.952 -0.881 [0.974] 353 0.5254
1991 3.1392 4.776 1.502 [0.833]*** 403 0.7264 1.1117 2.682 -0.458 [0.798] 333 0.5192
1992 3.5 79 4.593 2.583 [0.511]*** 406 0.7388 2.9214 4.150 1.692 [0.625]*** 336 0.5087
1993 2.8260 4.285 1.367 [0.742]*** 392 0.5094 2.6649 3.872 1.458 [0.614]*** 328 0.4388
1994 2.0657 2.799 1.333 [0.373]*** 392 0.8063 2.6868 3.605 1.769 [0.467]*** 333 0.5752
1995 3.1900 4.157 2.223 [0.492]*** 391 0.7703 1.8382 2.500 1.177 [0.336]*** 324 0.4927
1996 1.8575 2.377 1.338 [0.264]*** 385 0.8221 0.7894 1.257 0.322 [0.238]*** 318 0.5256
1997 2.1479 2.597 1.699 [0.228]*** 379 0.7903 0.8269 1.297 0.357 [0.239]*** 283 0.4753
1998 2.1254 2.576 1.675 [0.229]*** 367 0.7899 0.7881 1.261 0.315 [0.240]*** 269 0.5043
1999 1.4208 2.085 0.756 [0.338]*** 354 0.7749 0.6118 1.071 0.153 [0.233]*** 243 0.5914
2000 1.7337 2.343 1.125 [0.310]*** 345 0.7438 0.7727 1.458 0.088 [0.348]** 219 0.5049
2001 1.7995 2.453 1.145 [0.332]*** 312 0.6717 0.8430 1.515 0.172 [0.340]** 177 0.5081
2002 1.7718 2.464 1.080 [0.352]*** 306 0.6795 0.5551 1.283 -0.173 [0.369] 171 0.4252
2003 2.1873 2.814 1.561 [0.318]*** 288 0.6933 0.4489 0.954 -0.056 [0.256]* 160 0.5044
2004 2.0797 2.625 1.535 [0.277]*** 279 0.7730 0.1341 0.803 -0.535 [0.339] 158 0.4729
2005 1.9646 2.491 1.438 [0.267]*** 278 0.7027 0.4434 0.998 -0.112 [0.281] 158 0.5524
2006 1.4687 1.930 1.007 [0.234]*** 274 0.7806 0.8711 1.539 0.203 [0.338]** 156 0.5733
2007 2.5122 3.457 1.567 [0.480]*** 267 0.7438 1.4769 2.558 0.395 [0.547]*** 147 0.5294
2008 2.5324 3.478 1.587 [0.480]*** 260 0.6840 1.2186 2.040 0.397 [0.416]*** 145 0.5685
2009 1.8850 2.829 0.941 [0.479]*** 258 0.7245 0.5707 1.271 -0.130 [0.354] 147 0.6268
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the following levels: ∗
significance 10%, ∗∗ significance 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significance 1%.
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Figure 1. Estimates of Boone indicator using OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimates of Boone indicator using 2SLS 
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  Table 3 shows the results of the estimations using OLS, and Table 4 the results using 2SLS. 
Starting from the left, these tables show the Boone indicator, confidence interval, robust standard 
error, and sample size. In addition, Figure 1 depicts the OLS result and Figure 2 the 2SLS result as 
well as the confidence intervals. 
  In the estimation results for the financial institutions from all three business categories, the PE 
values from the 2SLS estimator are larger than those from the OLS estimator. The results show that, 
in the period 1990 to 1992, the fluctuation in the level of competition was large for both estimators, 
and in both, their trends moved in opposite directions. Note that their confidence intervals are quite 
wide and these estimates are not statistically different. However, the p-value rule should not be 
overconfident. In fact, the point estimates seems to have a long-run trend, and thus, we interpret the 
long-run changes in the estimates as change in competition. In this period, Japan experienced a 
bubble economy, followed by its collapse. In other words, it is assumed a period when there was 
major turmoil in lending markets. After this period, it is confirmed that both estimators trended 
roughly in parallel. In particular, it is confirmed that in both estimators, after 2003, the level of 
competition trended upwards, and then in 2009, dramatically declined. The capital markets were 
dysfunctional at that time due to the sub-prime loan crisis, and as a result, firms had difficulties 
raising funds by issuing stocks and corporate bonds. It is thought that demand for borrowing 
increased from those Japanese financial institutions that had managed to maintain their soundness, 
and thereby there was an easing of inter-bank competition. From these results, in the period other 
than 1990 to 1992, it can be observed that the regional lending markets became moderately 
competitive, although there were some fluctuations. 
  Next, we consider the results of the Boone indicator estimates according to business category. 
We confirm that the degree of competition for regional banks, Shinkin banks, and credit unions 
trended generally about the same. First, the degree of competition trended downward until the first 
half of the 1990s. However, caution is necessary when evaluating this period, because the width of 
the confidence interval is large. In the second half of the 1990s, we observe that the degree of 
competition levels off or increases moderately, while still fluctuating. We identify the following 
characteristics when we include the results of the Boone indicator estimates for the three business 
categories. First, considering the period as a whole, we observe that, while fluctuations were severe 
in the 1990s, on entering the 2000s, the degree of competition moderately increased. One reason for 
this is considered as follows: owing to the effects of the financial big bang that began in 1996, the 
markets became competitive in stages in each of the business categories. Moreover, it is possible 
that due to the effects of such events as banking mergers, the financial crisis, and the sub-prime loan 
problem, inefficient financial institutions left the market, which may have contributed to the 
increase in the degree of competition. Second, when we compare the averages for the degree of 
competition over the period, we find that for both estimators, the order is as follows: regional banks 
> Shinkin banks > credit unions. From 1989 to 1999, there were hardly any differences in the degree 
of competition between business categories, but these differences became large from 2000 onwards. 
In 1998, the Japanese government legalized financial holding companies. This led to a wave of big 
financial groups, including banks, insurance companies, and security companies, especially among 
city banks and regional banks. On the other hand, a number of relatively small financial institutions, 
that is, Shinkin banks and credit unions, failed to merge in these periods. This surge is evident in the 
figures indicating differences of competition among business categories after 2000. Third, we 
observe decreases in the degree of competition in the period after the collapse of the bubble, in the 
first half of the 1990s, and in 2009 immediately after the global financial crisis. It is considered that 
these were periods of turmoil in the regional financial markets and that this had an impact on the 
lending market. 
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3.3 Robustness checks of basic results 
In this subsection, we provide a check on the robustness of the results in the previous subsection. To 
do so, we replace the explanatory and/or instrumental variables in Eq. (12) with alternative variables. 
  First, the estimates are carried out by adding the ratio of non-performing loans to the control 
variable of the estimation equation in Eq. (12). Figure 3 shows the results of the estimations using 
OLS, while Figure 4 shows the results of the estimations using 2SLS. The estimation period used is 
1998 to 2009 owing to the availability of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimates of Boone indicator using OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Estimates of Boone indicator using 2SLS 
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  Second, the 2SLS estimates are carried out using the deposit-cost rate and the debt ratio as the 
instrumental variables. These results are shown in Figure 5. Third, the 2SLS estimates are carried 
out using the average cost as the instrumental variable. These results are shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Estimates of Boone indicator using 2SLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Estimates of Boone indicator using 2SLS 
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  Fourth, the estimates are carried out using the average cost instead of the marginal cost. The results 
of the estimates using OLS are shown in Figure 7, while the results using 2SLS are shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Estimates of Boone indicator using OLS (average cost) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Estimates of Boone indicator using 2SLS (average cost) 
 
 
  When we compare these results with the results using OLS in Figure 1 and 2SLS in Figure 2, 
we observe that, while the values are different for some of the period, in terms of the overall trend, 
there are no differences for any of the variables used. 
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3.4 Other measures of competition 
We now compare the results for the Boone indicator with those for other competition measures 
considered in the previous literature, namely the HHI, PCM, and H-statistic. The first indicator for 
market power is the HHI, which measures the degree of market concentration. This indicator is 
often used in the context of the “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) model, which assumes that 
market structure affects banks’ behavior, which in turn determines their performance. The idea is 
that a smaller number of banks makes collusion more likely. However, the HHI has a disadvantage 
in that concentration may be due to consolidation forced by intense competition. We calculate the 
HHI using the amount of loan data. This can be calculated as the sum of the squared market shares 
of all banks: 
 
 
 
where Q =   qi and qi is the amount of bank loan. Figure 9 shows the time series of the HHI for 
each type of banking institution. Roughly speaking, the HHIs tended to increase gradually, which 
suggests that the concentration ratio was rising in the Japanese banking industry through the sample 
period. As long as a rise in concentration means a decline in competition, this trend turns out 
opposite to the result for the Boone indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Estimates of the HHI 
 
  As discussed in subsection 2.1, market power may be related to banks’ profit. Second, a 
traditional measure of profitability is the PCM, which is equal to the output price minus marginal 
cost (mark-up of price), divided by the output price. This indicates that significantly higher profits 
may point to weak competition. We calculate the PCM as follows: 
 
 
 
where pi is bank loan interest rate, defined as the ratio of the interest on loans to the total amount of 
loans. ci is marginal cost,  ˆc  i. 
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Figure 10. Estimates of the PCM 
 
  The results of the PCM are shown in Figure 10. The results of the PCM for all financial 
institutions show that it continues rising from 1989 through to the mid-2000s. Bank market power 
increases from 1989 through to the mid-2000s, but rebounds somewhat from 2005. The point at 
which competition improves from the mid-2000s is consistent with the results of the Boone 
indicator. Despite the Japanese regional banking industry experiencing a deep crisis and financial 
liberalization during our sample periods, the HHI and PCM do not seem able to capture those 
influences. This discrepancy might occur by the reallocation effect, named by Boone et al. (2007). 
An increase in competition seems to reduce firms’ PCM. However, an increase in competition raises 
the market share of efficient firms with high PCM. Hence, attention should be paid to the results of 
PCM from the viewpoint of the reallocation effect. 
  Third, we estimate the H-statistic using Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) methodology. The H-
statistic is calculated from reduced-form bank revenue equations and measures the sum of the 
elasticities of the total revenue of the banks with respect to their input prices. The H-statistic is 
interpreted as follows. H < 0 indicates a monopoly; H = 1 indicates perfect competition; and 0 < H < 
1 indicates monopolistic competition. Moreover, under a certain assumption, a higher H means a 
higher degree of competition. To obtain the H-statistic, we estimate the following reduced-form 
revenue equation: 
 
 
 
where Ri denotes ordinary income, w1 is the interest rate for fund-raising, defined as the ratio of 
interest on expenses to the total amount of deposits, and w2 is the wage rate, defined as the ratio of 
personnel expenses to the number of employees. We add two control variables reflecting bank size 
effect, Xi, which is the number of branches and total assets. We take the natural logarithm of these 
variables. The H-statistic can be computed as 
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Therefore, H is the sum of the elasticities of the total interest revenue of the bank with respect to 
their factor input price. 
  On the other hand, while for the H-statistic, the size values and degrees of competition are 
proportional under conditions of certainty, as pointed out by Matsumura (2005), there are various 
problems with their use. The first is that the size of the value does not necessarily signify the degree 
of competition. In previous studies using the H-statistic, the values are from 0 to 1, and, in most 
cases, it is assumed that the closer the value is to 1, the higher is the degree of competition. This is 
established based on certain conditions, but in general, these conditions are not observed. Second, 
even without perfect competition, a judgment of perfect competition can be made, or conversely, 
perfect competition can be dismissed even though the competition is actually perfect. This captures 
the fact that it is only proven that the H-statistic equals 1 under a simple condition. Third, the H-
statistic can be negative in the case of a monopoly. In this case, it is difficult to judge the degree of 
competition. Fourth, as the findings of Panzar and Rosse (1987) are established only in the event of 
long-run equilibrium, they are not suitable for estimates using cross-sectional data. Even when using 
panel data, it is necessary to verify whether there is a state of long-run equilibrium. With these types 
of problems, the H-statistic is not suitable for verifying the degree of competition. However, we 
conduct estimations using the H-statistic with our data in order to carry out a comparison with the 
results from the previous subsection. 
  Figure 11 shows the time series of the H-statistic. The H-statistic fluctuates at a low level, and 
gradually decreases through the period. The estimated result shows that regional lending markets are 
monopolistically competitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Estimates of the H-statistic 
  
  Unlike the results from the Boone indicator, in the time series for each H-statistic, competition 
declined until around 2005, while still fluctuating. The results are consistent in that the degree of 
competition increased in the period after 2006, but at a low level in each of the banking industries. 
As indicated by the HHI and PCM results, it is difficult to imagine that competition in all three 
banking industries eased during this period, considering the failure of many regional financial 
institutions due to the financial crisis along with the long-term economic recession beginning in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
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  It seems that the estimated H-statistic does not capture the actual state of competitiveness in the 
Japanese regional banking industry during this period. Therefore, when viewed from this 
perspective, it can be said that our estimates using the Boone indicator offer extremely normal 
results. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In this study, we used the PE proposed by Boone et al. (2007) to verify the degree of competition in 
Japan’s regional banking industries (regional banks, Shinkin banks, and credit unions) from 1989 to 
2009. From the estimated Boone indicators, while we observed differences in the degree of 
competition according to business category, it was clarified that, over the long term, there was an 
upward trend, and Japan’s regional lending markets have become more competitive. In order to 
confirm whether this trend would have been evident with the other indicators, we used the sample 
from the same period and recalculated the data using the HHI, PCM, and H-statistic. However, 
when using these indicators, the opposite trend was observed, and the degree of competition 
decreased. 
  Our estimation period coincided with a time in which the financial market was undergoing 
deregulation in various ways and therefore, intuitively, we consider the results obtained from the 
Boone indicators to be more consistent with reality. 
 
Appendix: Estimation of Marginal Cost 
 
Because marginal cost is not observable, we estimate the translog cost function, as in the Hayashi 
(2000) approach. The cost function is C(q,w1,w2), where q is output and wj is factor price j = 1, 2. 
Taking the second-order Taylor expansion of ln C(q,w1,w2) with respect to ln q = 0 and ln wj = 0 (j = 
1, 2), we obtain: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A1) 
 
 
where   denotes the value that equals x minus its average. Note that we drop a subscript that 
denotes index, i = 1,…, n. We use the symmetry assumption, γjk = γkj (j, k = 1, 2). For j = 1, 2, share 
equations are 
 
(A2) 
 
where sj is the share of input factor j. Adding an error term to each share equation, we obtain 
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  Due to adding-up restrictions, 
 
 
(A4) 
 
 
  and the symmetry assumption, we rewrite the share equations as 
 
 
(A5) 
 
 
  We can estimate all of the parameters using only one share equation and the parameter 
restrictions. First, we estimate 
 
 
by OLS to obtain three parameters, α1, γ11, and γ1q. Then, using the restrictions, we obtain the other 
parameters, α2 = 1−α1, γ12 = −γ11, γ21 = γ12, γ22 = −γ21 and γ2q = −γ1q. Substituting these parameters 
into the translog equation yields 
 
(A6) 
 
where 
 
 
(A7) 
 
 
Because Eq. (A7) has no restrictions, we can estimate it by OLS to obtain α0, αq, and γqq. 
  Finally, differentiating the translog function with respect to output, we obtain marginal cost: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A8) 
 
From Eq. (A8), the marginal cost of bank output is  ˆc  i. 
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�∗ � �0 � �� �� � � 12��� ��� ��
2 � �, 
�∗ � ��� ����� ����
2
��1
� 12����� ���� ����
2
��1
2
��1
����� ���� �� �
2
��1
. 
 
�̂� � ����� , �1,�2���� 	
� ����
� �� ��
� �� �� 	
� ���� ���� � ��� �� �� � �1� ���1� � �2� ���2��. 
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